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A  variety  of  public  policies  aim  to  influence  workers’  disposition  of  pre-
retirement lump-sum distributions (LSDs) from pensions.  We use the implementation of 
several policy changes as natural experiments to test for rational and behavioral motives 
for saving behavior.  Using data from the HRS and the CPS in the 1980s and 1990s, we 
find  that  higher  tax  rates  on  cash-outs  increase  rollovers.  Controlling  for  the  overall 
effective tax rate, structuring the tax as a “penalty” or adding withholding taxes on cash-
outs  significantly  increases  rollovers.  Allowing  employers  to  unilaterally  cash  out 
balances  for  departing  employees  who  do  not  make  their  own  choice  significantly 
reduces the effects of higher tax rates but boosts the impact of withholding taxes.  These 
results suggest that both behavioral and rational factors influence workers’ choices, that 
policies relating to pre-retirement cash outs can interact in important ways, and that the 
government has several levers at its disposal to influence behavior beyond tax penalties.  
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  In the purely rational model of economic behavior, individuals respond to the 
incentives they face and they “see through” presentation and framing issues.   Recent 
research,  however,  suggests  that  household  saving  behavior  is  not  immune  to 
presentation  and  framing  issues  (see  Madrian  and  Shea  2001,  Duflo  and  Saez  2003, 
Bertrand et al. 2005, Duflo et al. 2006, Saez 2007). The research suggests, instead, that 
the manner in which a policy or program is presented can have first-order effects on 
individuals’  choices,  holding  economic  incentives  constant.    This  insight,  if  proven 
robust, suggests fundamental changes in modeling of saving choices, and new directions 
in public policies toward saving that could prove to be both effective and inexpensive. 
  This paper examines the importance of presentation and information, relative to 
and  controlling  for  pure  economic  incentives,  in  the  context  of  individuals’  choices 
regarding  the  disposition  of  pre-retirement  lump-sum  distributions  (LSDs)  from  their 
401(k) or defined benefit pension plans. Upon changing jobs, workers may leave their 
vested  pension  balances  at  their  old  employer  or  take  the  funds  as  a  lump  sum 
distribution.  If taken as an LSD, the funds may be "rolled over" to another qualified plan 
(typically, an Individual Retirement Account (IRA) or the defined contribution plan at the 
worker's new employer), used to purchase an annuity, or cashed out.   
  A variety of Federal rules aim to discourage pre-retirement cash-outs.  Employees 
owe ordinary income tax on cashed-out funds, as with all pension benefits.  They are also 
subject to a 10 percent penalty tax unless the account holder was older than 59.5 or the 
LSD was part of a job termination and the account holder was at least 55.  Employers are 
required to offer departing employees the option of directly transferring the LSD into an 
IRA or other qualified plan, and to assess a withholding tax of 20 percent on balances     2 
that are not transferred to those accounts. Working in the opposite direction, however, 
employers may unilaterally choose to cash out balances that are less than $1,000.
1  These 
policies  were  developed  in  major  reforms  in  1986  and  1992  and  smaller  reforms 
thereafter. 
    Previous research finds that a small percentage of LSD recipients roll all of their 
funds into qualified accounts, but that a larger share of dollars received in LSDs are 
rolled over.  The cumulative loss in retirement income (or “leakage”) from pre-retirement 
LSDs is relatively small compared to aggregate or average retirement wealth.
2   
  Nevertheless, pre-retirement cash-outs raise concerns.  The households who are 
more likely to cash out their LSDs tend to be younger, have lower income, have smaller 
accumulated balances, and have lower “tastes for saving” or financial sophistication, as 
proxied  by  less  education,  less  interest  income,  or  lack  of  IRA  ownership.    These 
characteristics tend to be shared by households that appear to be saving too little for 
retirement  (Engen,  Gale,  and  Uccello  (1999),  Hurst  (2003),  Scholz,  Seshadri,  and 
Khitatrakun  (2006))  and  by  households  for  whom  pension  or  401(k)  saving  actually 
represents an increase in wealth rather than a shifting of assets from taxable to the tax-
preferred  form  (Benjamin  (2003),  Engelhardt  and  Kumar  (2007),  Engen,  Gale,  and 
Scholz  (1996),  Poterba,  Venti  and  Wise  (1996)).    Moreover,  in  light  of  the  ongoing 
debate about the extent and nature of undersaving for retirement, the continued growth of 
                                            
1 See Munnell and Lee (2004) for a discussion of changes through 2004.  The maximum balance at which 
an employer may unilaterally force an LSD rose from $1,750 to $3,500 in 1984, and to $5,000 in 1998.  
Effective 2005, employers were required to rollover into an IRA any involuntary cash-outs larger than 
$1,000.  Congressional Quarterly Almanac 1984 (pp. 163-165). U.S.  Master Tax Guide 2007 (Para 2188). 
 
2  See  Andrews  (1991),  Burman,  Coe,  and  Gale  (1999),  Chang  (1996),  Engelhardt  (2001),  Fernandez 
(1992), Gustman and Steinmeier (1998), Hurd, Lillard and Panis (1998), Korczyk (1996), Poterba, Venti, 
and Wise (1998, 1999), Sabelhaus and Weiner (1999), Scott and Shoven (1996), and Yakoboski (1997). 
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defined contribution plans – where pre-retirement cash-outs are more widely available – 
and the increasing long-term pressures on the federal budget, a better understanding of 
how public policies affect LSD choices is essential to developing a retirement income 
system that can adequately address the needs and constraints of the modern work force 
and economy. 
  In this paper, we provide new theory and evidence on how public policies affect 
the  disposition  of  workers’  pre-retirement  LSDs.  We  develop  an  explicit  model  of 
rational behavior regarding pre-retirement LSD choices, and show that all of the major 
empirical patterns regarding LSDs identified in the literature and discussed above are 
consistent  with  rational  choice.
3  We  use  the  1986  and  1992  reforms  as  natural 
experiments  to  identify  the  effects  of  policy  changes.    We  explicitly  model  the  tax 
treatment  of  LSDs  from  1981  to  1992  and  estimate  how  the  substantial  tax  changes 
enacted in 1986 affected the disposition of LSDs.
4 We also examine the effects on LSD 
choices of the 1992 tax withholding rules, which have no impact on net tax liability.  In 
addition,  we  explore  interactions  between  policies,  an  important  consideration  when 
several policies operate simultaneously.   
Consistent with both rational and behavioral models, we find that higher effective 
tax rates on LSDs reduce cash-outs.  Several additional results, however, only make sense 
in a behavioral framework.  First, holding the effective tax rate constant, structuring some 
of  the  tax  as  a  “penalty”  appears  to  have  a positive  impact  on rollovers.    Second,  a 
                                            
3 We are aware of no previous formal theoretical modeling of pre-retirement LSD disposition choices. Hurd 
and Panis (2002) model the annuitization of LSDs at the time of retirement.  
 
4 Despite the substantial number of analyses of the individual determinants of LSD behavior (see footnote 
1), only Chang (1996) has examined the effects of tax policy changes. Chang (1996), however, uses the 
ordinary income tax rate plus any withdrawal penalties to proxy for the effective tax rate on LSDs.  In 
practice, the effective tax rate can vary substantially from that calculation.       4 
withholding tax on funds that are not rolled over directly from one account to another  – 
which does not affect ultimate tax burdens, but which makes the tax features more salient 
at the time of the rollover decision – has a significant impact on cash-out behavior.   
Third, the specification of default rules for whether the employer can cash out the 
balance has substantial impacts on the relative effectiveness of tax rates, tax penalties and 
tax withholding rules.  In particular, when the employer can unilaterally cash out the 
balance if not otherwise instructed, conventional tax rates and tax penalties (such as those 
imposed in 1986) that individuals face at the time of income tax filing (which occurs 
much  later  than  the  separation  decision)  have  little  effect  on  rollover  behavior; 
presumably because the employer has already acted by the time the individual focuses on 
the  tax  consequences.    In  contrast,  when  the  employer  can  unilaterally  cash  out  the 
balance  if  not  otherwise  instructed,  the  presence  of  withholding  taxes  imposed 
immediately on non-rolled over funds (such those enacted in 1992) have an increased 
positive effect on rollovers – even when the withholding tax has no net effect on tax 
burdens.    This  presumably  occurs  because  the  withholding  tax  makes  the  tax 
consequences salient to the individual at the time the rollover decision has to be made 
and so prods the individual to act before the employer makes a unilateral decision.   
The  findings  confirm  and  extend  previous research noted  earlier  showing  that 
economic  incentives  significantly  affect  behavior,  and  that  –  holding  such  incentives 
constant – relatively small changes in the presentation of an incentive can also have first-
order effects on economic behavior and the effectiveness of the policy.  The results also 
suggest  the  importance  of  understanding  interactions  among  policies  that  operate 
simultaneously.     5 
  Section I presents and discusses a simple, rational model of LSD choices.  Section 
II describes the data.  Section III discusses changes in tax and other policies toward LSDs 
over  time  and  the  construction  of  effective  tax  rates  on  LSDs.    Section  IV  presents 
descriptive patterns of LSD choices.  Section V presents regression results.   Section VI 
concludes.  
 
I.  A Rational Model of the Disposition of Lump-Sum Distributions  
  To start, consider a simple, rational model of LSD behavior. A worker seeking to 
finance a given consumption expenditure could finance the expenditure by taking a $1 
distribution from her pension, which yields $(1-τ0-π), where τ0 is her current marginal 
income tax rate and π is the penalty rate on early withdrawals.  Alternatively, she could 
withdraw $(1-τ0-π) from a taxable saving account or borrow the same amount.  Suppose 
her pension pays a pre-tax return of rp and the after-tax opportunity cost of funds (i.e., the 
interest  rate  on  saving  and  borrowing)  is  r.
5    In  terms  of  retirement  consumption 
(assumed to be N periods in the future), the cost of tapping the pension is (1+rp)
N(1-τN), 
where τN is the income tax rate in retirement. The cost of using another source of funds 
(taxable saving accounts or borrowing) is (1+r)
N(1-τ0-π). The net gain from taking the 
cash as an LSD from the pension versus tapping taxable saving or borrowing is    
 




τ π τ ≡  
 
  The break-even after-tax opportunity cost, r*, found by setting G=0, is 
                                            
5 To simplify exposition, we assume perfect certainty about future rates of return.     6 
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  The resulting decision rule is simple:  if the taxpayer’s cheapest source of funds 
has an after-tax rate of interest (r) less than r*, she is better off using that alternative 
source than tapping into retirement funds.  Formally, this is given by: 
 
(3)  Roll over none (withdraw all)   if r(0) > r* 
  Roll over all (withdraw none)   if r(L) < r*. 
 
  Equations (2) and (3) generate comparative static results that are consistent with 
the key empirical findings in the literature cited above.  Increases in the penalty rate (π) 
raise the likelihood of rolling over LSDs.  Younger households will be more likely to 
cash  out  LSDs,  since  r*  falls  as  N  grows  (larger  N  representing  a  younger  person). 
Higher-income households will be less likely to cash out funds because r* rises with the 
current tax rate (even if the retirement tax rate rises by the same amount) and they also 
tend to face lower costs of funds, r.  Taxpayers with stronger tastes for saving are likely 
to have more assets and thus have access to sources of financing with low net opportunity 
costs, such as home equity loans. In addition, they are likely to be better credit risks, 
which  lowers  the  interest  rate  they  must  pay  to  borrow.    For  both  reasons,  such 
households would face a low r and would be less likely to cash out the pension. 
  With convenient assumptions about functional form, this simple model of rollover 
behavior may be estimated with a probit model.  Substituting (2) into (3), the decision     7 












Ω = + − + −   − −  
 
where the rollover will occur if Ω is negative and withdrawal if Ω is positive.  The rates 
of return, r and rp are unobservable.  If we assume that  
  ln(1 ) ln(1 ) p r r Zβ ε + − + = +  
where Z is a vector of exogenous variables and ε~N(0,σ), then (3) can be written as  
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Equation (4) can be transformed into a probit by dividing through by σ. 
  The specification above does not allow for partial rollovers.  To introduce partial 
rollovers, we allow r to rise with the size of the LSD.   This is consistent with the idea 
that an optimizing consumer would finance expenditures from the least expensive sources 
first (home equity, passbook saving), and tap into more expensive sources (credit card 
debt, cash out from a pension) only when the cheaper alternatives are exhausted.  With 
this assumption, it is easy to show that partial cash-outs are more likely for larger LSD 
balances, consistent with the empirical evidence.  This full model can be estimated by 
maximum likelihood methods (see the Appendix). 
  The  models  discussed  above  are  based  on  fully  rational  behavior.    In  these  
models,  the  rollover  choices  depends  on  effective  tax  burdens  and  individual 
characteristics.    The  rollover  choice  does  not  depend  on  policies  that  alter  the     8 
presentation of effective tax rates, but do not alter the actual effective rate itself.  Such 
policies  include  whether  employers  can  unilaterally  cash  out  funds,  the  presence  of 
withholding taxes that do not affect overall tax burdens, or the presence of “penalties” 
versus ordinary income tax rates in the composition of the effective tax rate.  Evidence 
that  such  factors  influence  LSD  choices  would  suggest  that  factors  beyond  those 
discussed in the rational model could be important policy levers.  
 
II.   Data 
  To examine these issues empirically, we use data from the Current Population 
Survey (CPS) and the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), as well as information on tax, 
withholding, and other policy rules regarding LSDs.  
  The Employee Benefits Supplement (EBS) to the 1993 Current Population Survey 
was administered to a nationally representative subsample of individuals who, at the time 
of the interview, were employed and/or were between 25 and 64 years old.  Respondents 
were asked if they had ever received an LSD from a previous job.  If they had, they were 
asked about the type of pension involved, the year, amount, and the use of the funds.
6  
We focus on uses that preserve the funds for retirement, maintain the tax-preferred status 
of  the  funds  and  hence  do  not  trigger  a  tax  penalty.    Thus,  we  count  the  use  as  a 
“rollover” if the respondent rolled all of the funds into an IRA or purchased an annuity.  
If the respondent used any of the funds for other purposes, we count the entire transaction 
                                            
6 The LSD amount was top-coded at $100,000, but very few people were at the limit. We deleted one 
observation with a reported distribution of $99,999, which we suspect was an error in coding.  The code for 
one of the “other uses of the LSD” was 999,999 and we saw no plausible way the respondent in question 
could have accumulated such a large amount of funds. When appropriate, LSD amounts were converted to 
1993 dollars using the CPI-U index.   
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as a non-rollover.  Very few respondents reported multiple uses of the funds and the 
results  presented  below  are  not  sensitive  to  whether  partial  rollovers  are  counted  as 
rollovers or non-rollovers, or are excluded from the sample.  By matching the EBS to the 
March 1993 CPS, we collect information on the respondents’ age, level and composition 
of income, gender, race, education, marital status, and homeownership status.   
  We  use  data  from  the  7  waves  of  1992-2004  Health  and  Retirement  Study 
(HRS).
7  The initial 1992 HRS sample was drawn from households  with heads born 
between  1931  and  1941,  with  oversamples  of  Blacks,  Latinos,  and  Florida  residents.  
Subsequent  waves,  implemented  every  two  years,  have  expanded  the  HRS  panel  to 
include households with heads born between 1890 and 1953.  The HRS data largely 
parallels the information obtained from the CPS. HRS respondents are asked about the 
year, amount, and use of LSDs from previous jobs and the type of pensions involved.  
We follow the procedure used with the CPS data.  We distinguish between uses that 
preserve the tax-preferred and saving status of the funds – now broadened to include 
rolling over the funds (directly, or after an LSD) into an IRA or defined contribution 
plan;  leaving  the  funds  in  the  employer’s  plan;  purchasing  an  annuity;  or  receiving 
pension benefits – from other uses.  If any of the funds are used for non-tax-preferred 
purposes, we classify the transaction as a non-rollover; as in the CPS data, however, the 
HRS results are not sensitive to alternative treatments of the small minority of individuals 
who  choose  more  than  one  use.    We  supplement  the  LSD  information  with  data  on 
household income, and  the age,  gender,  race and educational  attainment of the head.  
                                            
7 We use the RAND version of the HRS, a cleaned and merged version of waves 1-6.  We apply the 
variable definitions from the RAND file to the HRS data to create a comparable version of wave 7.  The 
raw  HRS  files  and  the  RAND  data  are  available  to  registered  users  at  https://ssl.isr.umich.edu/hrs/. 
Additional information about the HRS is provided at http://hrsonline.isr.umich.edu/. 
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Unlike in the CPS, however, these controls reflect current conditions at the time of the 
survey where the job separation is reported.   
  Several additional differences between the CPS and HRS data are worth noting.  
Our analysis of the HRS data examines the disposition of defined contribution plans only. 
We draw most of our data from respondents' reports of job separations that occurred 
before they entered the panel, and these sections do not report whether an individual was 
offered an LSD option.  Since LSD options are uncommon among DB plans, but nearly 
universal among DC plans, we assume that all DC participants had an LSD option and 
ignore respondents with DB plans.
8  This approach to measuring LSD choices gives rise 
to  another  difference  between  the  two  data  sets:  workers  who  leave  their  account 
balances with their previous employers appear in the HRS, but not in the CPS.  Since 
leaving the funds at the previous employer is essentially a way to preserve DC balances 
for  retirement,  the HRS  therefore  shows higher  rollover  rates across the  board,  even 
though trends are very similar in both surveys.  Chang (1996), Engelhardt (2001), and 
Hurd and Panis (2002) find that between 10 and 18 percent of employees who have the 
option choose to leave their pension at their previous employer  when  changing jobs.  
Appendix  Table  1  reports  relevant  descriptive  characteristics  for  the  CPS  and  HRS 
samples.
9  
                                            
8 In addition to the retrospective sections where we gather most of our data on LSDs, the HRS reports 
information on any pensions a respondent might participate in at his current job, including whether that 
plan offers an LSD option.  In waves 1-3 of the HRS, more than 80 percent of DC participants report an 
LSD option for their current plan, compared to about 40 percent among DB participants (Hurd and Panis 
2002). 
 
9 The CPS appears to under-report LSD aggregates. The CPS records LSDs of about $20 billion in 1992.  
Alternative estimates, using a variety of data sources including tax records, place the total at about $75-80 
billion  (Woods  1996,  Yakoboski  1997,  Sabelhaus  and  Weiner  1999).    Nevertheless,  patterns  of  LSD 
disposition with respect to age and income appear to be similar in the tax records and the CPS data.   
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  We use the CPS data on LSDs received from 1981 through 1992 to examine the 
effects of the 1986 policy changes.  We use the HRS data on LSDs received from 1987 
through 1997 to examine the impact of the 1993 changes. These policies are described in 
the next section. 
 
III.  Policies Affecting LSDs  
  Before  1974,  LSDs  were  taxed  as  long-term  capital  gains.    The  Employee 
Retirement  Income  Security  Act  (ERISA),  enacted  in  1974,  differentiated  the  tax 
treatment of LSDs depending on whether the funds were deemed to have accrued pre- or 
post-1974 and whether the employee had at least 5 years of job tenure when the LSD 
occurred.  The pre-1974 amount could be treated as capital gains, or it could be treated as 
ordinary income.  The post-1973 portion was treated as ordinary income. If the employee 
had been in the plan for 5 years prior to disposition, all of the ordinary income (from the 
pre-1974 or the post-1973 portions) could be subjected to 10-year income averaging. For 
our purposes, a convenient feature of income averaging is that it is based on the tax 
schedule for single taxpayers; to determine the tax rate, the only information needed is 
the LSD amount and year it was received.  For the years 1980 to 1986, we calculate the 
tax rate assuming that LSD recipients in the CPS take the special 10-year averaging rule 
to determine their tax rate.
10 
                                            
10 This procedure is justified if two conditions hold: (i) the LSDs reported in the CPS were based on job 
tenures of 5 years or more, and (ii) income averaging was preferable to taxation as ordinary income for 
those recipients.  To gauge whether the LSDs reported in the CPS are for jobs held 5 years or more, we 
compare data on the number and magnitude of LSDs in the HRS and the CPS.  In the HRS, LSD questions 
are only asked if the employee has been at the job for 5 years or more.  Thus, if the CPS were capturing 
many LSDs from shorter job tenure, there should be more LSDs reported in the CPS and they should be 
smaller in size.  Appendix Table 2 shows that the HRS and CPS report similar numbers and magnitudes for 
LSD for the same age cohorts (when the HRS data are top-coded to match the CPS top codes).  To test the 
second condition, we examined hypothetical taxpayers in different years (1980 and 1986), income levels     12 
  The Tax Reform Act of 1986 made several significant changes in the taxation of 
LSDs.  Cash-outs were subject to a 10 percent penalty tax unless the account holder was 
older than 59.5 or the LSD was part of a job termination and the account holder was at 
least 55.   
  For workers younger than 50 as of January 1, 1986, LSDs were taxed as ordinary 
income (in addition to the penalty). For these households, we “back-cast” the income 
level reported in the 1993 CPS to the  year or LSD receipt, using aggregate personal 
income growth rates between the year when the LSD was received and 1993.  We reduce 
each component of income by the same proportion and calculate the marginal federal 
income tax rate in the year of LSD receipt, given the marginal tax rate schedules in effect 
in that year.  We assume the household took the standard deduction and had the same 
marital status and number of children as in the 1993 CPS and account for EITC phase-in 
and phase-out ranges. 
  Those over 50 years old as of January 1, 1986, could elect to designate the entire 
taxable cash-out as ordinary income or could divide it between a pre-1974 portion, which 
would be taxed at a flat 20 percent rate, and ordinary income.  In either case, the amount 
designated as ordinary income could be taxed under either 5-year averaging (using the 
current-year tax schedule for singles) or 10-year income averaging (using the 1986 tax 
schedule for singles).  Notably, for these households, we can calculate the tax rate on 
LSD income without reference to overall income, deductions or filing status.
11  For each 
                                                                                                                                  
(half-median, median and twice median income), LSD sizes (from $500 to $100,000), filing status (single 
and married filing jointly) and ages (25, 35, 45, 55 and 65).  For virtually every situation modeled, 10-year 
averaging was preferable to taxing some of the funds as ordinary income and the rest as capital gains 
(results available upon request).  Thus, both conditions appear to hold. 
 
11 To qualify for these tax options, the LSD recipient had to be at least 50 years old and had to be have been 
in the plan for 5 or more years.  Based on the calculations comparing the CPS and HRS described earlier in     13 
LSD recipient, we calculate the tax all four ways and choose the low-tax option. 
  To calculate r* in equation (2), we also need estimates of the tax rate in retirement 
(τN).   For LSDs before 1987, we assume the household faces the same tax rate on LSDs 
in retirement as it does during the working years. This is plausible since, as described 
above, the taxation of LSDs during that period did not depend on family income, only on 
the size of the LSD.  For LSDs after 1986 by households older than 50 as of January 1, 
1986, we make the same assumption using the same rationale. For LSDs received after 
1986 by households younger than 50 as of January 1, 1986, we estimate tax rates in 
retirement by assuming that recipients would remain in the same age-adjusted percentile 
of  the  CPS  sample  income  distribution,  and  would  retain  their  current  marital  status 
through retirement.  We then assign each recipient the income level corresponding to 
his/her percentile of the 65-69 year old income distribution from the 1993 CPS and in 
turn compute a baseline level of taxable income, accounting for marital status and the 
over-65 standard deduction.  On the basis of 1993 tax law, we then calculate the increase 
in tax liability that would result from receiving the LSD at this projected income level.  
The retirement tax rate is the ratio of estimated tax on the LSD to the amount of the LSD. 
  In other calculations needed to generate estimates of r*, we define N as equal to 
65 minus the age when the LSD was received, and rP, the nominal pre-tax rate of return, 
as 8 percent. 
  Besides  the  changes  in  effective  tax  rates  on  LSDs  described  above,  policy 
makers have enacted a series of changes in rules regarding cash-outs and withholding 
                                                                                                                                  
the text, our analysis assumes that all households who cashed out LSDs and who were older than 50 in 
1986 also had been in the plan for at least 5 years. To the extent that this assumption is incorrect, our 
estimates will understate the impact of LSD tax changes on behavior. 
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taxes.    Importantly,  for  our  purposes,  there  were  no  change  in  effective  tax  rates 
associated with these changes.     
  Starting in 1984, firms were allowed to cash out accounts on a unilateral basis 
(i.e., without the departing employee’s approval) if the balance was below $3,500.  This 
provision relieves plan sponsors of the responsibility for managing small accounts for 
former workers.  But it does not make it more difficult for workers to choose a rollover.  
If the firm tells the worker that it is cashing out the pension (i.e., choosing not to manage 
the account anymore), the worker can still elect to roll the funds into a tax-preferred 
account either directly or after receiving a cash distribution.
12  
  As of 1993, any qualified plan with a cash-out option had to offer recipients the 
option of rolling over their balances directly to another qualified plan or an IRA, and a 20 
percent withholding tax was imposed on any balances that were not directly rolled over to 
such accounts.
13  These changes have remained law since 1993.   
   
IV.  Descriptive Patterns  
A. CPS  
                                            
12 Our sample period ends in 1997, a cutoff date motivated by the 1998 adjustment of the involuntary cash-
out limit from $3,500 to $5,000. The default disposition of a mandatory cash-out between $1,000 and 
$5,000  was  changed to  an IRA  rollover  effective  2005.   Also,  as  of  2000,  any  form  of  capital  gains 
treatment was eliminated for recipients born after 1935 (those who were 50 and older as of January 1, 
1986).  Sources: Congressional Quarterly Almanac 1997 (pp 7-28 to 7-29).  U.S. Master Tax Guide 2001 
(Para. 2153).  2005 change: U.S. Master Tax Guide 2007 (Para. 2188). 
 
13 Employees who elect to receive the distribution and then transfer it into a qualified account themselves 
may still make supplementary contributions up to the amount withheld, which is excluded from gross 
taxable income so that the entire balance can in effect be transferred to a qualified account even if the 
transfer is not done directly.  If, however, this self-directed rollover does not take place within 60 days of 
the distribution, the amount withheld is added back into gross income.  Individuals who intend to roll over 
their balances but do not choose direct rollover thus have to finance the last 20 percent of the rollover out-
of-pocket in order to preserve the tax-preferred status of their balances.  Source: U.S.  Master Tax Guide 
1994,  Para 2188.  
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  Table 1 reports rollover rates and measures of the cost of cashing out an LSD over 
time and across age groups.
14  The few households that report rolling over some but not 
all of their LSD are classified as not having rolled over the funds.  Using the CPS data, 
the cost of cashing out an LSD rose after 1986 by large amounts for recipients between 
ages 25 and 54, but by relatively small amounts for recipients aged 55 to 64.
15  For 
example, the first row shows that, after 1986, policy changes raised r* – as defined by (2) 
and parameterized as discussed above – by 3 times as much for households younger than 
55 as it did for households older than 54. 
  Because  r* is a  complicated  amalgam  of several  items,  it may  be  difficult  to 
interpret these results.  In addition, r* may not be the most salient aspect of tax policy 
toward LSDs; in a behavioral model, for example, the current tax burden on cash-outs 
and/or its designation as a tax or penalty could affect behavior. For these reasons, we also 
present results for the current tax rate on cash outs (τ0+π) and the current rate less the 
retirement tax rate (τ0+π-τN).  These measures of tax policy changed in the same relative 
manner as r*, with larger increases for younger households after 1986.  For recipients 
younger than 55, the current tax rate rose by 20 percentage points and the difference 
between the current and retirement tax rates rose by 12 percentage points.  For recipients 
                                            
14 We use the sampling weights provided in the CPS and HRS for all tables in the paper.  The CPS weights 
are  constructed  to  scale  the  EBS,  which  is  administered  to  a  subsample  of  the  CPS,  to  the  national 
aggregates observed in the full CPS sample.  The HRS requires weighting because it oversamples several 
demographic groups.  The HRS covers only certain birth cohorts and is a panel data set.  The HRS weights 
for each wave scale to CPS-reported aggregates for the surviving population of the relevant birth cohorts at 
the time of the survey.  Because our cross-section is drawn from all 7 waves, there is no "true" population 
that our weights scale to (due to demographic change over the course of the panel.)  We assign each 
respondent the sampling weight from the latest wave in which he appears, which for most of our sample is 
Wave 7 (reference year 2003).  Unweighted data and estimates do not differ importantly from weighted 
numbers shown in the text. 
 
15 Treating 25-54 year olds as a single group is a useful simplification.  Each of the 25-34, 35-44,  and 45-
54 year old groups experienced similar increases in LSD tax rates (19.3, 21.0, and 21.2 percentage points, 
respectively) and other tax measures, and relatively similar increases in rollover probabilities (7.4, 13.9, 
and 12.4 percentage points, respectively).      16 
older than 54, the increases were just 2 and 3 percentage points, respectively.
16 
  Changes in the probability of rolling over an LSD are broadly consistent with the 
changes in tax rates.  As shown in the fourth row, after 1986, the likelihood of rolling 
over an LSD rose by 11 percentage points among recipients younger than 55 and fell by 
23 percentage points among recipients older than 54.  
  As noted above, starting in 1984, employers could unilaterally cash out LSDs 
with balances of $3,500 or less.  Table 1 reports tax rates and rollover behavior for LSDs 
with  balances  above  and  below  that  threshold,  with  three  interesting  results.    First, 
consistent with the research cited earlier, the likelihood of rolling over an LSD is lower 
when smaller balances are at stake.  Second, the cost of cashing out large and small LSDs 
changed by very similar amounts after 1986.  For recipients younger than 55, the current 
tax rate rose by 22 percentage points for large LSDs and 18 percentage points for small 
LSDs.
17 Third, despite the similar  changes in taxation of large  and small  LSDs after 
1986, rollover behavior sharply diverged.  For large LSDs, the likelihood of rollover rose 
by  19  percentage  points  among  recipients  younger  than  54.    For  small  LSDs,  the 
likelihood of rollover increased by just 2 percentage points for recipients aged 25-54.    
B.  HRS 
  Table 2 examines rollovers in the HRS data for 1987 to 1997.  Consistent with the 
treatment in the CPS, we classify the few households that report rolling over some but not 
all of their LSD as having not rolled over the funds. The HRS rollover probabilities are 
                                            
16 Chang (1996) finds a much smaller increase (3 percentage points) in the mean LSD tax rate among 
recipients under 55, and finds a decrease of 5 percentage points among older recipients.  Our estimates 
apply the tax laws applicable at the time, as described above. Chang uses the marginal statutory tax rate on 
ordinary income.  
 
17Very few workers over 55 had balances of $3,500 or less, so we omit these workers when we cut our 
sample by size of LSD. 
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higher  than  the  corresponding  CPS  values;  one  reason  is  that  the  HRS  contains 
information on funds left at a prior employer, whereas the CPS does not (as discussed 
above).  After the 1993 policy changes, the probability of rollover increased by 11-13 
percentage points in each age group. The probability of rollover rose by 26-31 percentage 
points for recipients with small LSDs, but by just 5-9 percentage points for recipients 
with large LSDs.   
C.  Summary  
  The descriptive data above frame the key questions we address below.  First, the 
cost of cash-outs rose substantially after 1986 for recipients aged 25-54 but not for those 
aged 55-64. Rollover behavior changed in similar ways, rising for those younger than 55, 
falling for those above age 54.  Thus, one set of questions revolves around the extent to 
which the tax policy changes in 1986 were responsible for the changes in rollovers, and, 
if so, which elements of the tax changes mattered most.  
   Second, although the overall probability of a rollover rose after 1986 and 1992, 
and although large and small LSDs faced similar increases in effective tax rates after 
1986 and similar changes in withholding rules after 1992, rollover trends for large and 
small LSDs diverged sharply.  As Figure 1 shows, after 1986, rollovers of large LSD rose 
significantly, while rollovers of small LSDs were essentially unchanged.  After 1992, 
rollovers of small LSDs increased substantially, while the increase in rollovers for large 
LSDs  was  smaller  in  absolute  value  and  mixed  in  sign.    A  second  set  of  questions, 
therefore,  relates to why recipients of large  LSDs reacted so differently  compared to 
recipients of small LSDs.   
     18 
V.  Regression Results  
A. Effects of the 1986 changes 
  Table 3 reports the results of probit and OLS regressions using CPS data for the 
years 1981 to 1992.  In each regression, the dependent variable takes the value 1 if the 
respondent rolled over the entire LSD into an IRA or qualified account or used it to 
purchase an annuity, and 0 otherwise. The independent variables include dummies for 
educational attainment, the age-adjusted quintile of total family income, the age-adjusted 
quintile of interest and dividend income, homeownership, race, age when the LSD was 
received,  and  an  indicator  for  whether  the  LSD  was  received  after  1986.
18    For 
continuous variables, the table reports marginal effects evaluated at the sample mean. For 
discrete variables, the table reports the effect of a change in the variable from zero to one, 
with all other covariates set to sample means.
19  The regressions differ in the specification 
of tax variables, as discussed below.   
(i) All LSDs  
  We focus initially on the first and fourth columns of the table, which report probit 
and OLS results for LSDs of all sizes.  These equations are represented by R = Xβ1 + Tγ1 
+ ε, where R is the rollover decision, X is the independent variables listed above, T is a 
vector of tax variables.  In Regression 1, T is represented by the variable r*, defined 
                                            
18 To determine the age-adjusted quintiles for income, households are divided into 5-year groups (25-29, 
30-34, etc.) and ranked within their respective group.   
 
19 We have also estimated the maximum-likelihood model described in the Appendix.  Unlike the probit or 
OLS regressions in table 3, the maximum likelihood estimates allow for partial rollovers (which are treated 
as cash outs in the probit/OLS regressions) and account for the amount of the distribution that is rolled 
over.  The MLE estimates for r* gave very similar implications to the probit/OLS estimates.  The MLE 
predicts an increase in rollovers of 6 percentage points due to the 1986 changes.  As discussed in the text, 
the probit in equation (1) predicts a change of 5 percentage points.  Since the results are so close, and since 
there are very few partial rollovers in the data, we focus on the probit/OLS results.   
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above.  The coefficient on r* is statistically significant and the marginal effect implies 
that  the 1986  changes  raised  the  number  of  rollovers  by  approximately  5  percentage 
points.
20  Regression 2 replaces r* with the current tax rate (including any penalties that 
apply)  on  cash  out.    Raising  the  current  tax  rate  by  10  percentage  points  raises  the 
probability  of  rollover  by  7.0  percentage  points. As shown  in  Table  1, the  1986 tax 
changes raised the current tax rate by 20 percentage points for households between the 
ages of 25 and 54; thus, they would be estimated to have raised rollover rates by 14 
percentage points.  Regression 3 replaces the current tax rate with the difference between 
the current tax rate on LSDs and tax rate that is projected to occur in retirement.  The 
coefficient on this variable is not significantly different from zero. As shown below, the 
imprecision of the estimate partly reflects heterogeneous responses among respondents 
with different account sizes.  
  Taken together, the first three regressions suggest that the 1986 changes in the 
effective tax rate on cash-outs may have increased the likelihood of rollover, but the 
evidence is not overwhelming.  This result is consistent with rational models of behavior, 
since the incentive changed, and with behavioral models, since a “penalty” was imposed.   
(ii)  Penalties 
A related question is whether, holding the effective tax rate constant, labeling part 
of it a “penalty” has a different effect than labeling it a “regular” tax rate.  In a purely 
rational model, the label should have no effect; in a behavioral model, the stigma of being 
forced to pay a “penalty” may have an added deterrent effect on cash-outs, even after 
controlling for the current tax rate (which already includes the penalty).   
                                            
20 The coefficient patterns for other independent variables are similar to those in previous research, much of 
which uses the CPS, and are not reported here.   
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  This question is addressed in regressions (4) through (6).  In these regressions, T 
is given by the same tax variables as in regressions (1) through (3) and a penalty dummy 
that takes the value of 1 for recipients between the ages of 25 and 58 in years after 1986.   
In each regression, the penalty dummy has a large and statistically significant effect.  
These results imply that, holding the overall effective tax rate constant, constituting some 
of  the  effective  tax  rate  as  a  10  percentage  point  “penalty”  rather  than  a  change  in 
“regular”  tax  rates  raised  rollovers  by  16  to  24  percentage  points.  These  large  and 
significant estimates of the effect of the penalty tax, when controlling for the overall 
effective tax rate, support a behavioral model of LSD choices, rather than a fully rational 
one.
21  
(iii)  Large and Small LSDs 
  Table 1 and Figure 1 show that, although tax rates changed similarly for large 
(>$3,500) and small LSDs after 1986, rollover patterns differed sharply.  These results 
are robust to regression analysis.  Columns 2-3 report the results of a probit regression of 
the form R = Xβ2L + Tγ2L + Xβ3(1-L) + Tγ3(1-L) + ε, where L = 1 for LSD balances 
above $3,500 and 0 otherwise.  Column 2 reports probit estimates of γ2.  Column 3 
reports  probit  estimates  of  γ3.  Columns  5  and  6  report  similar  results  for  OLS 
specifications. 
  In  regressions  (1)  through  (3),  the  tax  variables  have  positive  and  significant 
effect on rollovers of large LSDs.  In the first two specifications, the coefficients on the 
tax variables are 30-40 percent larger for large LSDs (in columns 2 and 5) than for all 
                                            
21 Another possibility is that none of the three alternative specifications used in (4)-(6) captures the true 
effective tax rate that taxpayers face and therefore that rejection of the rational model is founded on an 
invalid representation of that model.  By using three alternative measures of tax rates, we hope to guard 
against this potential problem.  
     21 
LSDs (in columns 1 and 4).  The coefficient in regression (3) is several times as large for 
large LSDs as it is for all LSDs and is estimated precisely.  All of the estimates imply that 
rollovers of large LSDs are sensitive to tax considerations. In contrast, the point estimates 
for  small  LSDs  (in  columns  3  and  6)  are  uniformly  negative  and  not  significantly 
different from zero; the regressions show no evidence that the substantial tax changes 
enacted in 1986 had any impact on the rollover of small LSDs.  The p-value for the 
difference in effects for large and small LSDs is reported in brackets below the estimates.  
In all three regressions, the differences are significant at conventional levels, with p-
values ranging from .002 to .050.
22  When the penalty dummy is added in regressions (4) 
through (6), consistent results obtain:  the penalty raises rollovers of large LSDs by 16-32 
percentage points (columns 2 and 5).
23 
  These results indicate substantial differences between rollovers of large and small 
LSDs in response to the tax changes in 1986.  Given the similar changes in effective tax 
rates, the source of the differing behavior must be sought elsewhere.  One possibility is 
that allowing employers to act unilaterally in making a rollover decision for small LSDs 
dulls the effects of tax incentives for that group.  One reason the employer decision might 
dominate the tax effect is that, even with the 1986 changes, workers are not forced to 
confront  the  tax  implications  of  their  choices  until  they  file  taxes  the  year  after  job 
separation.  In  contrast,  the  employer  likely  would  have  acted  at  the  time  of  the  job 
separation. If this hypothesis is correct, then imposing withholding taxes (which do not 
                                            
22 We estimate the p-value using a slightly adjusted specification:  R = Xβ2L + Tδ2L+ Xβ3 (1-L) + Tδ3 + ε.  
These estimates recover the same effects as in the regressions reported in the text, but make it easier to read 
off the p-value of the difference as simply the p-value of δ2.  
 
23 We can not estimate the penalty regressions for small LSDs because the very small sample of 55-64 year 
olds  with  small  LSDs  before  1986  (n=3)  introduces  extreme  multi-collinearity  between  the  post-1986 
variable, the age 55-64 variable, and the penalty variable.   
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change  the  actual  tax  consequences  of  a  decision,  but  may  serve  to  make  the  tax 
consequences salient at the time of the rollover decision) should have a significant impact 
on the rollover of small LSDs.  We examine that hypothesis below. 
B.  Effect of the 1992 Withholding Changes  
  To examine the impact of the 1992 withholding changes, we use data from the 
HRS.  For a variety of reasons, however, it is more difficult to calculate r* or the current 
tax rate that applies to LSD choices using the HRS data than in the CPS.  As a result, in 
the HRS analysis, we focus on variation in the effective tax rate on LSDs that is induced 
by variation in age of the recipient at the time of the LSD receipt, and the year of the LSD 
receipt, controlling for other factors.  Table 1 shows that there are substantial variations 
in the effective tax rate on LSDs based on these factors in the 1981-92 period.  
  First, we show that this procedure generates plausible results using the CPS.  We 
replace the tax and penalty variables in the CPS data with interaction terms between age 
group and year of LSD receipt. That is, we estimate regressions of the form R = Zα0 + 
α1(age<55) + α2(age>55) + α3(age<55)(year>1986) + α0(age>55)(year>1986) + ε, where 
age<55  (age>55)  are  dummies  that  take  the  value  1  if  the  LSD  recipient  was  55  or 
younger (older than 55) and 0 otherwise, and year>1986 takes the value 1 if the LSD was 
received in a year after 1986 and 0 otherwise.  Z is the X vector used in Table 3, but with 
age and year variables omitted. The results of this regression (shown in the first two rows 
and in columns 1 and 4 of Table 4) show that after 1986, rollovers of all LSDs in the CPS 
rose by 12-13 percentage points among 25-54 year olds and did not change significantly 
for 55-64 year olds.  In columns 2-3 and 5-6, we interact the variables above with LSD 
size,  as  in  table  3.    For  LSD  recipients  aged  54  or  younger,  the  change  in  rollover     23 
behavior after 1986 was much larger for large LSDs (shown in columns 2 and 5) than for 
small LSDs (shown in columns 3 and 6) and the difference is significant at p-values of 
.01 or less.  This is consistent with the results in Table 3.
24  
  The second regression in Table 4 reports regressions using the HRS from 1987-
97.    The  regressions  control  for  educational  attainment,  age-adjusted  quintile  of 
household income, race, and year of LSD receipt.
25  The 1992 changes raised rollovers by 
roughly 12 percentage points among 35-54 year olds and by about 10 percentage points 
among 55-64 year olds.  Thus, the withholding rules appear to have had their intended 
effect.  This supports the behavioral model in two ways.  First, the change in law made it 
easier  for  individuals  to  rollover  since  all  companies  were  required  to  offer  a  direct 
rollover.  Second, the withholding tax rule did not actually change the tax burden for 
rollovers and only affected it minimally (through the timing of the tax payment) for those 
who cashed in.  The rational model developed above implies little impact on rollover 
behavior from such changes.      
Interestingly, the effects again differ between large and small LSDs, but in this 
case, rollovers of small LSDs are much more responsive to the change than rollovers of 
large LSDs.  Recipients of small LSD balances raised their rollovers by 23-30 percentage 
points (columns 3 and 6).  Recipients of large LSDs raised their rollovers by just 4-12 
percentage points, and these effects are not significant among recipients older than 55.  
For older households, the difference in coefficients has p-values of .034 in the probit and 
                                            
24 Chang (1996) reports a 9.1 percentage point increase in the likelihood of a rollover as a difference-in-
difference estimate of the effect of the 1986 reforms on recipients younger than 55 relative to those aged 55 
or older.   
 
25We calculate age-adjusted quintile of total household income using income data and age in the survey 
year closest to the job separation in question.       24 
.019 in the OLS specification.   
The  fact  that  withholding  had  an  effect  is  evidence  against  a  purely  rational 
model.  The withholding rule had no impact on effective tax rates, but it made the tax 
consequences of rollover choices more salient at the time a decision has to be made.  In a  
model of rational calculating individuals with foresight, these changes should have no 
effect.  In a variety of alternative models, however, such changes could have significant 
effects  –  if  people  understand  the  withholding  tax  to  represent  a  suggestion  by 
government that rolling the funds over would be a good idea, if people do not have 
foresight, etc.   
The fact that the withholding rules had effects mainly on small LSDs suggests 
that interactions among policies could be quite important.  Recall that in the years before 
and after 1993, firms could cash out small balances if there was no directive from the 
departing employee.  The withholding rule may have made employees pay attention to 
the rollover decision at the time it had to be made and then choose to keep the funds in a 
tax-preferred account, thus not giving firms the chance to make unilateral choices.   
  Finally, the fact that tax withholding created the largest differences between large 
and small LSDs among households who were older than 55 is further evidence of the 
non-rationality of the response.  These households would be most likely not to bear any 
penalty for cashing in the funds.
26  
 
VI.   Conclusion   
  Policy makers have expressed significant concerns about pre-retirement cash-outs 
                                            
26 Duflo et al. (2006) and Choi et al. (2005) provide further evidence of irrational behavior related to 
retirement saving among individuals 59 and older.      25 
of  retirement  account  balances.    Our  evidence  shows  that  effective  tax  rates  affect 
individuals’ decisions to rollover or cash out their balances.  The link between tax rates 
and  rollovers  is  not  surprising,  and  is  consistent  with  both  rational  and  behavioral 
considerations.   
  Several additional results help clarify the channels through which public policies 
influence  rollover  behavior,  and,  in  general,  point  to  the  importance  of  behavioral 
considerations.  First, specifying some of the effective tax rate as a “penalty” (as was 
done in 1986) rather than as an “ordinary” tax rate has a significant impact on behavior.  
Indeed, controlling for both the existence of a penalty, and the overall effective tax rate 
(including the penalty), the existence of a penalty dominates the results.  Second, the 
1992  changes  –  which  required  employers  to  offer  a  rollover  option  and  imposed 
withholding taxes on funds that were not rolled over but did not affect the ultimate tax 
burden  on  rollovers  versus  cash-outs  –  led  to  substantial  increases  in  rollover 
propensities.  Third, the 1986 changes – which altered the effective rate of taxation – 
were associated with little change in rollovers of small LSDs, but substantial increases in 
rollovers of large LSDs.  In contrast, the 1993 changes – which did not alter the effective 
tax rate, but which may have made the rollover choice easier and more attractive for 
workers – were associated with substantial increases in rollovers of small LSDs that were 
as large as, or larger than, the increase in rollovers of large LSDs.  This pattern may have 
occurred because the tax withholding rules make the tax consequences of the rollover 
decision salient to the worker at the time the decision needs to be made, whereas changes 
in effective tax rates do not necessarily come to the worker’s attention until the tax return 
has to be filed.       26 
The  results  have  implications  for  the  relative  importance  of,  and  interactions 
between, economic incentives and psychological factors in household saving behavior.  
They offer policy makers new and potentially powerful dimensions along which to alter 
public  policy.    The  results  also  suggest  that  when  public  policies  aim  to  influence 
behavior through a variety of interventions, the interactions among the interventions can 
play a first-order role.  Finally, the results imply that the content of a public policy can 
and  should  be  considered  to  be  broader  than  just  how  it  affects  individuals’  budget 
constraints.     27 
Appendix 
 
  This Appendix derives the maximum likelihood representation of a model of LSD  
choices that allows for partial rollovers.  Let  
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In the special case where α=0, r(L) = r(0) and the probit model holds.  
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% .  Maximization of (A-
2) will produce consistent estimates of 1/σ, -β/σ, and α/σ.  Note that, if L were a 
constant, (A-2) would be the likelihood underlying an ordered probit.  The variant where 
L is different for each taxpayer may be estimated by general maximization techniques.       28 
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Change in Tax Rates and Rollover Behavior by Year and LSD Size

















      Change in LSD tax rate, 1981-86 to 1987-92                  
(CPS)
Change in probability of rollover, 1981-86 to 1987-92       
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Year of Receipt 1981-86 1987-92 1981-86 1987-92 1981-86 1987-92 1981-86 1987-92 1981-86 1987-92 1981-86 1987-92
r*
1 8.0 8.6 8.0 8.2 8.0 8.7 8.0 8.2 8.0 8.5 -- --
LSD Tax Rate
1 6.3 26.6 11.4 13.1 7.0 29.0 11.4 13.1 5.7 24.0 -- --
LSD Tax Rate - Retirement Tax Rate
1 0.0 11.7 0.0 3.1 0.0 11.6 0.0 3.1 0.0 11.8 -- --
Probability of Rollover
1 16.6 27.7 58.9 35.9 21.9 41.4 58.9 35.9 11.7 13.6 -- --
Observations 419 1121 14 60 189 554 14 60 230 567 -- --
Source: Authors tabulations using the 1993 Employee Benefit Supplement of the Current Population Survey.
1) In percentage points.






Tax and Rollover Summary Statistics 1981-92
Table 1LSD Size
Age of Recipient
Year of Receipt 1987-92 1993-97 1987-92 1993-97 1987-92 1993-97 1987-92 1993-97 1987-92 1993-97 1987-92 1993-97
Probability of Rollover 57.4 70.0 62.9 74.0 66.4 75.3 71.1 76.5 29.4 55.2 33.2 64.0
Observations 324 276 162 421 230 194 128 333 94 82 34 88
Source: Authors tabulations using waves 1-7 of the HRS.
35-54 55-64 35-54
(Health and Retirement Study)
55-64
All figures are obtained using HRS sampling weights.
Table 2
Tax and Rollover Summary Statistics 1987-97
35-54 55-64
All >$3500 <$3500All LSD>3500 LSD<3500 All LSD>3500 LSD<3500
(1) r* 7.99 10.60 -8.93 9.26 12.98 -7.22
(.026) (.009) (.328) (.025) (.008) (.219)
(2) LSDtax 0.70 0.91 -0.14 0.81 1.16 -0.11
(.001) (.000) (.696) (.000) (.000) (.678)
(3) LSDtax - Retirement Tax Rate 0.31 1.16 -0.42 0.28 1.32 -0.30
(.365) (.023) (.432) (.418) (.028) (.363)
(4) r* 1.50 0.84 --- 3.06 0.81 ---
(.752) (.863) --- (.549) (.871) ---
Penalty Dummy 0.21 0.30 --- 0.26 0.32 ---
(.047) (.039) --- (.069) (.028) ---
(5) LSDtax 0.56 0.74 --- 0.68 0.983 ---
(.009) (.009) --- (.002) (.002) ---
Penalty Dummy 0.16 0.18 --- 0.20 0.166 ---
(.067) (0.110) --- (.081) (0.170) ---
(6) LSDtax - Retirement Tax Rate -0.22 0.336 --- -0.18 0.42 ---
(.574) (.591) --- (.589) (.556) ---
Penalty Dummy 0.24 0.285 --- 0.33 0.28 ---
(.004) (.034) --- (.005) (.046) ---
Notes:
{.018}
Probit Marginal Effects OLS Estimates
Table 3
Marginal effect coefficients represent dF/dx, the marginal effect on the probability of rolling over.  For dummy variables, the estimates show the 
effect of switching from 0 to 1.  All marginal effect estimates calculated at the mean of the independent variables. P-values for individual 
coefficients are reported in parentheses. P-values associated with the difference between samples (i.e. LSD greater than $3,500 versus LSD less 
than $3,500) are reported in brackets. 
Sampling weights from the April CPS are used.
Rollover in the CPS is defined as rollover to an IRA or the purchase of an annuity, which are tax-preferred relative to other uses reported in the 
data.  
Policy Effects on Rollover Behavior
{.050} {.008}
{.017} {.002}
(1981-92, Current Population Survey Data)
{.033}Sample All LSD>3500 LSD<3500 All LSD>3500 LSD<3500
CPS Received 1981-1992
(1) (Age 25 - 54)*(Year 1987 - 92) 0.126 0.206 0.048 0.116 0.197 0.027
(.000) (.000) (.202) (.000) (.000) (.321)
(Age 55- 64)*(Year 1987 - 92) -0.098 -0.099 --- -0.167 -0.163 ---
(.33) (.319) --- (.257) (.258) ---
HRS Received 1987-1997
(2) (Age35 - 54)*(Year 1993 - 97) 0.124 0.115 0.231 0.127 0.115 0.227
(.004) (.022) (.002) (.002) (.015) (.001)
(Age 55- 64)*(Year 1993 - 97) 0.103 0.043 0.268 0.103 0.043 0.302
(.028) (.397) (.003) (.026) (.389) (.002)
Notes:
Table 4
Rollover Behavior by Year, Age, and LSD Size
{.000}
{0.117}
Sampling weights from the April CPS are used.
Marginal effect coefficients represent dF/dx, the marginal effect on the probability of rolling over.  For dummy variables, the 
estimates show the effect of switching from 0 to 1.  All marginal effect estimates calculated at the mean of the independent 
variables. P-values for individual coefficients are reported in parentheses. P-values associated with the difference between samples 
(i.e. LSD greater than $3,500 versus LSD less than $3,500) are reported in brackets. 
Rollover in the CPS is defined as rollover to an IRA or the purchase of an annuity, which are tax-preferred relative to other uses 
reported in the data.  





Balance Any $3,500 or Below Over $3,500 Any $3,500 or Below Over $3,500
Total Income * $24,606 $18,727 $29,917 $72,885 $50,665 $79,729
($24,851) ($15,147) ($30,149) ($78,198) ($46,677) ($84,451)
Age at LSD 36.8 33.9 39.4 51.5 50.9 51.7
(8.9) (7.0) (9.5) (7.3) (6.8) (7.4)
Age at survey 41.4 38.6 44.0 54.8 54.1 55.0
(9.1) (7.4) (9.7) (4.9) (5.3) (4.8)
Nonwhite - percentage of total 8.8% 9.9% 7.9% 12.6% 12.6% 12.5%
(.284) (.299) (.270) (.332) (.332) (.332)
Educational attainment
Percentage of total with highest degree of:
Less than high school 4.2% 4.2% 4.2% 11.2% 15.3% 9.9%
High school degree 28.9% 28.9% 22.3% 35.7% 48.9% 31.7%
Some college 22.0% 22.0% 21.6% 23.8% 21.5% 24.5%
College degree 35.1% 35.1% 36.6% 21.4% 12.5% 24.2%
Post-college degree 9.8% 9.8% 15.3% 7.9% 1.8% 9.7%
Observations 1614 797 817 1183 885 298
Standard deviations in parentheses
Appendix Table 1: Covariate Summary Statistics for the CPS and HRS Samples
* Current dollars.  We use income as reported at the time of the survey.  That is, CPS income is for 1992, while HRS income is reported for the year of the 
survey in which the LSD is reported (ranging from 1991 to 2003).  To some extent, then, higher incomes in the HRS reflect inflation.  Also, the CPS 
sample uses family income, while the HRS sample uses household income.
CPS HRS
CPS and HRS sampling weights are used.  Sample sizes here may be smaller than those reported in Table 1 because some obvservations are missing data 
on these control variables.Percent of sample who received
at least one LSD in 1975-91
       unweighted 7.8 8.9
       weighted 7.7 9.4
Of those who received LSD,
percent who received it in 1975-86
       unweighted 54.1 58.8
       weighted 54.7 58.4
Weighted Distribution of LSD Amounts
  1975-86*
        max 130,390 215,053
        mean  14,306 18,419
        75th percentile 16,951 20,348
        median 8,723 8,796
        25th percentile 2,999 3,086
Weighted Distribution of LSD Amounts
   1987-91*
         max 123,504 123,456
         mean 22,709 26,674
         75th percentile 33,207 30,864
         median 10,735 12,345
         25th percentile 2,965 4,119
*Dollar Amounts in 1992 Dollars
a. CPS sample is restricted to respondents who are in the same age cohort as the HRS 
respondents. The HRS data are tabulated to match CPS top-codes.
CPS HRS w/ top code
Appendix Table 2
Distribution of LSD Amounts: CPS & HRS
a